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turns specifically to §506 of the Act, using case exam-

Digital samples are to rap music as precedent is to
the practice of law. Lawyers, mindful of the principle of
stare decisis, mine court opinions for arguments to support legal theories. Similarly, rappers use the lyrics and
musical arrangements found in previously recorded
works to spin out new and creative pieces. But whereas no one worries when a lawyer quotes pieces of old
case law to fashion her arguments in a novel case, rappers' heavy reliance on digital sampling routinely puts
their community front and center in a debate over copyright infringement. Given some recent results of that
debate, now more than ever rap stars, sound engineers,
and record producers need to be fully aware of the copyright laws and of the consequences of infringement.
Unfortunately, that may not be an easy task. The
sections of the Copyright Act concerning sampling do
not afford artists, their lawyers, or the courts the necessary standards to determine whether a criminal act of
copyright infringement has occurred. Similarly, those
sections fail to dictate whether instances of alleged
infringement should be turned over to federal prosecutors, resulting in criminal prosecutions for samplingrelated infringement that often seem random at best.
Moreover, even where the ultimate end of compliance
with the statute presents itself clearly, the complex
processes often necessary to acquire the copyright holder's authorization may still make the means difficult to
ascertain. For instance, artists may find it virtually
impossible to locate the actual copyright holder of an
older, obscure piece of music. In other cases, such as
where an independent record label has gone out of
business, even figuring out who that party is can be
troublesome.
Considering the severity of most criminal penalties
for infringement-anything from huge monetary sanctions to prison time-the uncertainty surrounding sampling poses a significant threat to the rap industry. In
an attempt to alleviate some of that uncertainty, this
Note explores the criminal provisions of the Copyright
Act and the ways in which these provisions have been
applied (or misapplied) to digital sampling. It begins by
tracing the historical background of criminal infringement as embodied in the Act. It then describes the
development of digital sampling and its impact on the
music industry, particularly the rap industry. Next, it
surveys what qualifies for protection under the
Copyright Act and discusses the rights afforded to
artists who hold valid copyrights. The analysis then

ples to show how ambiguous language contained in that
section threatens to change the way artists perform
their craft. Finally, the Note concludes that the proper
application of copyright principles to digital sampling
requires uniform adoption of §506's "specific intent"

paradigm when handling cases involving alleged criminal infringement of copyrights.
HISTORY OF
Passed in 1790, the
no mention of criminal
as the only remedy

THE COPYRIGHT ACT
first federal Copyright Act made
sanctions, leaving civil penalties
Copyright
for infringement. 1

infringement didn't become a criminal offense until
1897, when Congress passed the first major set of
amendments to the 1790 Act. 2 The amended Act still

limited the imposition of criminal sanctions to situations involving unauthorized performances and representations of copyrighted dramatic and musical compositions, and provided for imprisonment up to one year
only if the unlawful performance and representation
was willful and for a profit.3 The Act also introduced
the differentiation between criminal and civil copyright
violations based upon whether the infringement was
4
pursued for purposes of commercial exploitation.
Similarly, the legislature clearly prescribed a mens rea
requirement for findings of criminal violations, requir5
ing "a specific criminal intent to infringe."
The next turn of the century brought more changes
for copyright law. In an attempt to curb the increasing
number of willful acts of copyright infringement, the
legislature expanded the criminal provisions of the
Copyright Act. 6 Criminal penalties were thought to be
more effective than civil damages because the so-called
"pirates" were transient and financially irresponsible,
7
making injunctions and civil damages futile.
But by the 1970s, the issue of criminal infringement
still loomed large. Again facing the familiar problem of
how to reduce piracy, the legislature implemented two
significant expansions to criminal
First, the
copyright liability. 8
Sound Recording Act of 1971
extended general copyright protection to sound recordings, which had
been routinely victimized by piracy
to the tune of nearly $100 million
Second, Congress
annually. 9
increased the financial penalty for
copyright infringement in order to by
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deter what had become a lucrative criminal enterprise. 10 Congress was not, however, willing to take the
extra step of increasing the potential imprisonment
term for copyright. Rather, legislators seemed to suggest that although infringement could be deemed criminal, it would always be considered an economic
offense that did not warrant significant criminal
sentences. 11
Just a few years later in 1976, the Copyright
Act underwent yet another major revision. This
time, the drafters changed the mens rea requirement from "for profit" to "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain."12 This
small but critical distinction aimed to clear up any
confusion about whether the pirate had to be motivated by commercial gain or whether he simply had to
receive a financial benefit to be in violation of the Act.
Fines for most forms of infringement increased to a
maximum $10,000; infringers of sound recordings and
motion pictures, however, fell subject to maximum fine
of $25,000.13
Nevertheless, the ingenuity of copyright law continued to lag behind that of the criminal infringers. For
example, in United States v. LaMacchia, the district
court in Massachusetts confronted a situation where an
MIT graduate student (LaMacchia) had actively encouraged the free trading of copyrighted computer software
via a password-protected electronic bulletin board.
While morally condemning LaMacchia's actions, the
court regretfully held that he could not be prosecuted
for criminal infringement.14 The critical factor was the
element of financial gain-or rather, the lack thereof.
The court noted that, from their very origins in 1897,
criminal provisions of the Copyright Act always
required prosecutors to prove that a defendant acted
with such financial motives. 15
LaMacchia, while
undoubtedly fostering infringing activity, had never
benefited financially from any of the transactions;
hence, in the eyes of copyright law, his actions were not
criminal. 16 If the criminal copyright laws required revision, the court concluded, Congress would have to take
the responsibility for those changes. 17 Consequently,
the Massachusetts district court dismissed the case and
suggested that the current "for commercial advantage
or financial gain" requirement under the Copyright Act
be revisited. 18
Arguably, Congress didn't even need the court's push.
The rapid development of the Internet was rapidly forcing the problem of copyright piracy to the forefront of

legislative concern, and Congressional leaders quickly
realized that as more and more users logged onto the
Internet, the possibilities for copyright
infringement grew exponentially.1 9 In response, they
enacted

the

No
Electronic
Theft
(NET) Act to widen
the scope of criminal copyright laws.
The
NET
Act
directly addressed
the laments of the
LaMacchia
court,

establishing criminal
fines and penalties for
the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works by
electronic means even when the perpetrator receives no
20
financial benefit from his acts.
While the NET Act appeared to solve some of the
problems found in the Copyright Act, critics contended
that Congress had ultimately failed to clear up several
ambiguities in the criminal sections of the Act by not
simply adopting a straightforward "specific intent"
mens rea requirement. Instead, they claimed, the legislature had merely deferred the interpretation of the
criminal provision to report language or existing case
law for guidance.
The issue was resurrected again with a proposed
amendment to the NET Act, which stated that for purposes of §506(a) of the Copyright Act only, "a person
does not infringe a copyright willfully unless that person has an intent to violate another person's copyright. '2 1 Some members noted that not all federal case
law required such a standard, and that the amendment
might make it more difficult for the Department of
Justice to prosecute some cases. 2 2 Supporters of the
"specific intent" model answered by pointing out that
the interpretation of a critical provision of the
Copyright Act should not determined according to the
relative ease with which the Justice Department can
prosecute. In the end, however, inconsistent prosecutions may have obscured the letter of the law after all,
leading to a resolution in no one's interest.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING
Musicians have always borrowed from the past. Jazz
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musicians, for instance, quote from their peers and
predecessors out of "deference, for humor, or to make a
Similarly, pop artists often use past
statement. ' 23
recordings as resources, and disc jockeys create novelty
"flying-saucer" records that use snippets of contemporary hits to answer mock interview questions. 24 In

Formed the backbone of a new brand of hip-hop.
Perhaps unwittingly, however, they also perpetuated
what was quickly becoming a new tradition of rap-the
possible conflict between the rap community and copyright law.
That conflict surged into the spotlight as the modern-

samples are nothing more than
legacy inherited by present rap

lay music "bootlegger" emerged. 3 2 Bootleggers gained
nitial popularity by copying recently released Bronx
33
hip-hop tapes and distributed the music to friends.

these respects, digital
musical tradition, the
artists from the greats
For hip-hop, those

of the past.
origins go all the way back to
African oral tradition. 25 But it wasn't until 1979 that
rap music-then still largely an underground, subcultural movement-found its modern-day sound in the
rhythms and beats of yesteryear. That year, the Sugar
Hill Gang recorded a soon-to-be hit called "Rapper's
Delight" that featured the bass line of the Chic's "Good
Times" as a rhythmic base for their own creative
rhymes. 2 6 At that point, copyright wasn't even an issue
due to the noncommercial medium in which rap exist27
ed.
But the sounds of the underground couldn't stay
underground for long. The hip-hop movement soon
gained speed and notoriety with huge commercial successes from the likes of Public Enemy and the Fresh
Prince with DJ Jazzy Jeff.28 All of the sudden, rap occupied mainstream culture-and whether fans realized it
or not, so did sampling. For instance, in the summer of
1988, Rob Base and DJ E-Z Rocks' "It Takes Two," filled
the airwaves and moved nightclubs from Illinois to

This "generosity" created legions of fans; it also
spawned a formidable tension between the rap community and the newly revisited Copyright Act. 3 4 Similarly,
.ssues related to sampling drew more attention as sampling itself became routine and widespread. Soon, the
egality of the entire rap industry was open to ques35

;ion.
But such a question demands a detailed understand.ng of exactly what rap artists do to implicate copyright
concerns. For instance, "digital sampling" can best be
defined as the act of an artist using portions of a previously recorded work in a new recording. 3 6 However, the
process of sampling is predictably much more complex.
It consists of three main steps: (1) digital recording, (2)
computer sound analysis and possible alteration, and
(3) playback. 3 7 Each step contains its own complexities;
consider one description of "digital recording" alone:
Digital recording refers to the process of converting sound waves into binary digital units
("bits") intelligible to a computer. When
sound waves reach the transducer of a microphone, they cause it to vibrate in sympathy
with the waves. This in turn creates an electrical pressure, or analog signal, which corre-

Ibiza. 2 9 The song was not only
infectious, but also
familiar.

And no

wonder: the sampled base line
from
came
legthe
endary

,

"Godfather
Soul,"
of
J a mn e s
Brown. 30
the
In
1990s, A Tribe
Called Quest led
the effort to fuse jazz
Whatever
with hip-hop.
its differences from other forms of rap, jazz rap immediately shared the love of sampling. 31 Original tracks
from jazz greats such as Charlie Parker and Roy Ayers

9

sponds constantly with changes in the vibration of the sound waves as it is being
received. In order for a sound to be stored in
a computer, an analog signal must be translated into bits by an analog-to-digital converter, which measures the voltage of the signal at discrete, equally spaced intervals in
time. Each of these measurements, or "samples," is given a binary numerical value and
recorded in the memory system of a computer. A digital recording of an entire song, then,
is simply a series of binary values, each representing a discrete moment of the song's
38

duration.
Once "sampled," a recording can be manipulated
electronically. 3 9 In general, sound technicians can use

m, si lnte
48

the sample in one of three ways. First, if it has a unique
sound or sequences of sounds, the technician can reproduce that sound or sequence on subsequent recordings. 40 Second, synthesizer operators can perform as
entire bands using only the sounds of sampled musi-

ment.
Nevertheless, the compulsory licensing scheme
remains rarely used. 4 9 Instead, the parties routinely
negotiate so-called "mechanical licenses." Both artists
and publishers alike normally favor these arrangements because they avoid the strict requirements of a
compulsory license. 50
Otherwise, the mechanical
license differs from the compulsory license in only a few
respects. First, the mechanical license permits the
record company to pay royalties to the publishers for
records sold, paid for, and not returned. 5 1 Second, the
record company can avoid notice or identification
requirements. 5 2 Finally, the record company can control the accounting procedures for distributing royalties
by paying royalties (1) quarterly rather than monthly,

cians. 4 1 Finally, the sampled music can be bought and
42
sold like any other musical resource.
In much rap music, DJs repeatedly play samples of
other records as background. Digital sampling therefore allows rap artists to bypass the traditional, expensive method of hiring bands to create musical tracks
over which the artists then lay their lyrics. Instead,
with sampling, artists can take a portion of a known or
unknown record and combine it with their own creative
input in a seamless package or "mix." Sound simple?
Perhaps, but this "simple" mixing formula has resulted
in some of the biggest hits of recent years.

and (2) without certification or filing of accounting in
53
the Copyright Office.
At first glance, the licensing systems currently in
place in the record industry seem sufficient to handle

Of course, the question is whether it has also resulted in some of the most blatant copyright infringement
as well. According to modern copyright law, from the
moment a track is laid down, copyright automatically
vests in the song's creator.4 3 The Copyright Act grants
the artist a bundle of rights, which grants the artist
exclusive domain over the reproduction, performance,
display, and general commercial exploitation of the
work and the rights in the work.4 4 The basic scheme of
the recording industry gives record companies the
rights to own and exploit records, and music publishers

the demands of record labels and artists who want to
use a previously recorded piece of music. However,
problems may arise when trying to acquire a mechanical license from obscure, independent, or out-of-business labels. In those cases, determining who holds the
copyright may prove impossible, thereby limiting an
artist's options to either assuming the risk of copyright
infringement or foregoing the use of the recorded piece
entirely.

the rights to own and exploit songs. 45 If an artist wants
to sample another artist's work, therefore, the sampling
artist has two basic choices under the Copyright Act:
follow the strict provisions of the "compulsory license"
section, or negotiate directly between the publisher and
the record company.
The compulsory license provisions of the Copyright
Act are set forth in §115. That section provides that
after a record containing a non-dramatic song has first
been commercially distributed to the public with the
consent of the copyright owner, any other record company may subsequently produce and distribute records
that contain the song by entering into a statutorily
determined licensing arrangement. 46 In other words,
once a record or song is released to the public with the
consent of the publisher, other recording artists can
record the song without securing direct permission from
the publisher that owns the song. 4 7 However, they
must comply strictly with the notice, payment, and
accounting provisions of the compulsory license as specified in § 115, as failure to do so can constitute infringe-

COPYRIGHT LAW
Assuming the first path and switching sides for the
moment, an artist-plaintiff must meet certain threshold
requirements when deciding to bring a copyright claim.
First, the artist must prove ownership of the copyright
interest in the sound recording. 5 4 Second, she must
successfully establish that the sound recording used in
the defendant's work is a direct "dubbing" of the "actual sounds" of the original work, rather than an "independent fixation" of other sounds. 5 5 Third, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's recording substantially
and materially copies her own. 5 6 Finally, even after the
plaintiff has established her case, she will commonly
have to ward off the contention that the defendant's
57
sampling constitutes fair use.
Obviously critical to any copyright suit, proof of ownership must be established as a precursor to any action.
Initial copyright ownership for a musical composition
vests in the author of the work. Courts have defined the
authorship requirement under section 102(a) as refer199
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ot protect against copying that results in any67
)ther than substantially similar expression.
yright holders also have the exclusive right to
'e derivative works. The Copyright Act defines a
tive work as "a work based upon one or more pre-

ring specifically to the "creator of that work."' 58 Simply
put, the owner is the person who conceives of the copyrightable expression and fixes it, or causes it to be fixed,
in a tangible form. A work is considered fixed in a tangible medium of expression when it "has been placed [by
the creator] in a relatively stable and permanent
embodiment. '5 9 However, when a work is "made for
hire" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the party
who pays for creation of the work, rather than the cre60
ator himself, is deemed the author.

g works, such as a translation, musical arrangedramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
n, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
isation, or any other form in which a work may be
transformed, or adapted. ' 68 Courts interpreting
rivative work right have generally held that
ants must have appropriated a substantial porthe underlying work in order to infringe on a
69
ght owner's rights.

In order to have a valid copyright, however, the
author's creation must also be original. At its most
basic level, this requirement simply means that the
work cannot be copied from another. 6 1 In the music
industry, it has been argued that each person's vocalization of music constitutes an original expression,
which meets the requirement of the Act so long as it also
62
meets the fixation requirement.
Assuming both requirements have been satisfied, a

third right in the bundle is the exclusive right of
ution. The term "distribution" encompasses virevery imaginable type of public dissemination,
ing sales, rentals, leases, or loans. Distribution
are crucial to the music industry because they
authors to be paid for their works. However, once
hor transfers title to a copy of the work to a third
the third party is entitled to sell or dispose of the
al without obtaining the copyright owner's connder the doctrine of "first sale." 70 The "first sale"

plaintiff would then proceed to §106 of the Copyright
Act to discover the rights that accompany a valid copyright. 6 3 The bundle of rights granted by the Act in § 106
includes the exclusive right to: (1) reproduce the copyrighted work, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute copies of the work to the public for sale, lease, or
64
rent, and (4) perform or display the work publicly.
According to the Act, copyright
holders also possess the
rigght to
exclusive
§106
assign their
rights to oth Ser

ae relies on the reasoning that once the copyright
has had the opportunity to profit from the initial
the copy, the policy goal of protecting the owner
gives vay to the policies disfavoring limitations on the
71
alienaltion of property.
La .stly, authors hold an exclusive right to perform

a
. . .

65

parties.
The right to
reproduce is
one of the
most fundam e n t a 1
*7
advantages of
the copyright
A
monopoly.
copyright owiner
may make er idless
copies of he r work,
while, in son ie instances,
preventing others from making even a

*(

an,d display their works publicly. According to the
opyright Act, to "perform" or "display" a work
means "to recite, render, play, dance, or act it,
either directly or by means of any device or
process or, in the case or a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to show its images in
any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." 72 The Act defines "public" performances as involving one of four situations: (1)
f the performance occurs at a place open to the
pu blic; (2) if the performance occurs at a place in
whic]h a substantial number of persons outside the
norma 1 circle of a family and its social acquaintances is

1

gather ed; (3) if the performance is transmitted or otherommunicated to a place open to the public; or (4)
performance is transmitted or otherwise commud to the public by means of any device, regardless
ther the public receives it. 7 3 Section 106(4), howexcludes sound recordings from the public per-

single copy without explicit permission. 6 6 However,
this right only encompasses material copies. Simply
reading a work aloud, for instance, does not constitute
copying. Similarly, the exclusive right to reproduce
200

m si n te
formance provisions. Thus, for example, radio a:
vision stations may broadcast copyrighted
recordings with no obligation to the owner of col
even though they must obtain a license from the
of copyright in the musical works that are recor,
The importance of the §106 bundle of r ights
arguably lies in the efficacy of §501, which defir ies
a copyright infringer as, "anyone who violate
any of the exclusive rights or the copyright
owner, or of the author."7 5 Interpretations of
this section have suggested that only copying
that involves "all or [a] substantial portion of
the actual sounds that make up a copyrighted
76
recording" will constitute infringement.

fl

Copyright infringement also requires proof c
both ownership and copying. 77 While proof of o rnership may be established according to the guididines
set forth above, copying is generally proven by establishing access to, and substantial similarity b
78
the two works.
Even when those two elements can be prove
ever, a defendant may appeal to the doctrine
use." That doctrine has been called by some "tf
'7 9
I
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.
even defining what is meant by fair use proves d
Commentators have suggested that a possible de:
might go something along the lines of, "a privi
other than the owner of the copyright to use th
righted material in a reasonable manner with
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted
owner by the copyright. 8 0° Luckily, however, t
Copyright Act transformed the amorphous comrr
defense of fair use into a statutory right with r
81
able bounds.
Applied case-by-case, the fair use defense extii
es infringement liability for certain unauthoriz(
of a copyrighted work. Usually, qualifying "fai
entail those that fulfill educational, news reporl
82
I
literary purposes, such as parody or satire.
basic principle behind the "fair use" defense is f]
ty. Thus, the doctrine allows courts to avoid rigi(
cation of the copyright laws whenever such w(
unfair, or would inappropriately stifle the creat
production and dissemination of useful works
public--"the very activity that the copyright lI
83
meant to foster."
When such a defense doesn't apply, however,
ties for infringement can be stiff. Civil remedies:
injunctions against further copying, actual d,

and recovery of the infringer's profits, and/or statutory
damages. But §506(a) of the Act also provides that "any
person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
T
M
ded.
private
financial gain" has
comi nitted
a
criminal
0f :ense. 8 4
The pres

s

*

cribed
penalty
depends upon the
nature of the work
infringed and on the
particular acts of
infringement
involved.
Statutory
damages (ranging from
$250 to $10,000) may be

awarded in lieu of actual
damages and defendant's profits, but only if the plaintiff has registered the work with the Copyright office within certain
time limits. Felony copyright infringement carries a
maximum sentence of five years in prison for a first
offense. 8 5 For a second offense, the maximum term
doubles to ten years; after that, subsequent violations
86
receive up to six years apiece.
Section 506(b) also provides another critical remedy
in cases of criminal infringement. It allows for the "forfeiture and destruction.., of all infringing copies or
phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies
or phonorecords."8 7 Due to the reduction of prison sentences for federal crimes, forfeiture aims to punish
infringers for the lucrative economic crime of copyright
infringement by taking away any means of continuing
or repeating the crime. 88 Leading copyright scholars
such as David Nimmer have suggested that "by far the
biggest impact on the infringer emerges from the
seizure provisions of the Copyright Act." 8 9
Another key difference between civil and criminal
infringement deals with the infringer's state of mind.
In cases of civil copyright infringement, intent to
infringe need not be proven. For an infringement to be
deemed a criminal violation, however, a specific mens
rea for "willful infringement" must exist.90 Without the
requisite mens rea, it does not matter how many unauthorized copies or phonorecords have been made or distributed; no criminal sanctions can be assessed. 9 1
Courts have interpreted the "willful" requirement of
the Act in two distinct manners. The alleged copyright
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infringer must posses either a "general intent" or a
more exacting "specific intent" to infringe. The general
intent requirement simply requires that the artist
intended to commit some act of duplication of an original work. To prove specific intent, on the other hand,
"the government must prove.. .that the defendant knew
that his acts constituted copyright infringement or, at
least, knew that there was a high probability the his
92
acts constituted infringement.
Specific intent thus involves requires more than
notice and copying; it requires that the defendant actually possess knowledge of, and intent to violate, the law
of copyright. For example, in U.S. v. Moran, 9 3 an owner
of a small video store, who purchased videotaped
movies, made a single copy of a tape for rental and
94
retained the original in case the copy was damaged.
At trial, the defendant stated that he thought his
actions were proper. 95 The court determined that the
defendant's honest and good faith belief that his actions
were not infringing disproved willfulness. 9 6 The court
also accepted the defendant's alternative argument that
§506 requires specific intent interpretation, rather than
a general intent requirement. 9 7 The court acknowledged that in complex statutory schemes, such as federal criminal statutes, the term "willful" means a "volun98
It
tary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
stated:
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his
liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of the records he
maintained, should become a criminal by his
mere failure to measure up to the prescribed
standard of conduct. This was evidently so
because '[t]he proliferation of statutes and
regulations has sometimes made it difficult
for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations
99
imposed by the tax law.'
The Moran court buttressed its argument by reasoning that there was nothing in the text of the criminal

R

tation that relies heavily on the defendant's subjective
belief. Thus, the test is not the reasonable person test,
but rather whether "the defendant truly believed that
the law did not proscribe his conduct. ' 10 2 Under
Moran, if a defendant truly believes that he is not subject to the copyright laws, then this subjective belief
would preclude a finding that he "willfully" violated the
statute. 103

Finally, the court relied heavily on the civil provisions of copyright for guidance in criminal cases. In the
civil context, there is "strict liability" for infringement,
even where the infringement was "innocent."' 10 4 When
used for purposes of assessing statutory damages, "willful" has consistently been interpreted to mean that the
infringement must be "with knowledge that the defen10 5
dant's conduct constitutes copyright infringement."'
As mentioned, the alternative to the specific intent
interpretation of "willful" within the context of the criminal copyright section is the less exacting standard of
generalized intent. And indeed, some courts have suggested that "willful" refers only to an intent to copy, not
to infringe. For instance, in United States v. Backer, 106
the Second Circuit decided that the defendant willfully
infringed a copyrighted figurine. After examining the
facts, the court stated, "there can be no doubt that the
appellant deliberately had the copies made and deliberately sold them for profit."' 1 7 At no point did the court
bother with the question of whether the defendant realized that the reproduction of the figurines violated the
copyright act. Instead, it simply examined whether the
defendant intended to reproduce the figurines and
whether the defendant attempted to gain profit from
This generalized intent gave
that reproduction. 1 0 8
10 9
grounds enough to support criminal liability.
SETTING THE STAGE FOR CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION UNDER § 506(A)
The question of criminal liability for sampling first
reached the courts in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.

copyright statute, the overall scheme of the copyright
laws, or the legislative history to suggest that Congress
intended the word "willful" to mean simply an intent to
00
copy.1
In holding as it did, the Moran court rejected an

Warner Bros. Record, Inc. 110 There, Judge Duffy of the
United States District Court of New York found that
rapper Biz Markie had released a recording that used,
without permission, three words and a bit of the music
from Gilbert O'Sullivan's song, "Alone Again
(Naturally)." 111 Clearly not accepting any of the rapper's appeals to the widespread use of sampling, the

objective standard by which the court would judge the
defendant's actions against the reasonable person standard. 10 1 Instead, it adopted a specific intent interpre-

judge forwarded the case to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution under §506. The determination was driven by
the fact that Biz Markie and his attorneys knew of the

m si n te
obligation to obtain clearance before using the copyrighted work in another piece. 11 2 Also, the plaintiffs
submitted a letter showing that the defendants knew
11 3
that sample clearances were pending at that time.
Judge Duffy responded to such evidence with a condemnation of Biz Markie:
[I]t is clear that the defendants knew that
they were violating the plaintiff's rights as
well as the rights of others. Their only aim
was to sell thousands upon thousands of
records. This callous disregard for the law
and for the rights of others requires not only
the preliminary injunction sought by the
plaintiff but also sterner measures.114
Clearly, the outcome of Grand Upright Music thus
provided strong words of warning to the rap community, suggesting that sampling had its limits.
Unfortunately, as a rather extreme case, it provided little in the way of an articulable standard for understanding what level of intent is required to be held criminally liable for a copyright infringement. Realistically,
the defendants in Grand Upright Music would have
been held criminally liable for their actions using
either a general or specific intent standard.
Nevertheless, after the Grand Upright Music decision, artists need to have some way of understanding
the risk of sampling without consent. Since Judge
Duffy appeared to be influenced heavily by evidence
pointing to specific knowledge and disregard by the
defendants, the specific intent model is arguably the
best way to analyze such a situation. Moreover, a case
can be made for the proposition that the specific intent
standard is objectively more appropriate to employ
when dealing with criminal prosecution for copyright
infringement.' 1 5 For instance, commentators have suggested that when courts face the complex nature of
copyright infringement, the most exacting standard
possible must be employed in order to protect the liber11 6
ty interest of the defendant.
As a result, despite the extreme nature of the case, it
may still be useful to see why the defendants in Grand
Upright Music would be guilty of criminal infringement
even under a specific intent standard. The record in the
district court is clear and provides an accurate account
of the relevant facts. The defendant admitted that the
plaintiff owned a valid copyright.1 1 7
Before Biz
Markie's album was released, the various defendants
"apparently discussed among themselves the need to
obtain a license" for the plaintiff's samples.11 8 They

decided to contact the original artist by writing to his
agent and enclosing a copy of the rapper's tape. n 9 Each
defendant then testified that he knew it was necessary
to obtain a license-sometimes called a "clearance"from the holder of a valid copyright before using the
20
copyrighted work in another piece.1
From all the evidence produced in the hearing, the
judge held that it was clear that the defendants knew
that they were violating the plaintiff's rights. In particular, he commented on the nature of the defendants'
letter to plaintiffs: "In writing this letter, counsel for the
Biz Markie admittedly was seeking 'terms' for the use of
the material. One would not agree to pay to use the
material of another unless there was a valid copyright! ' 12 1 Thus, the judge or jury in a criminal trial,
using the specific intent standard, should find that the
defendants understood that a valid copyright existed.
The second piece of the analysis under the criminal
provision of the Copyright Act involves determining the
defendant's state of mind during his conduct. 12 2 The
Supreme Court has said, "it is important to recognize
that the rule does not require that a defendant's belief
that his conduct is lawful be judged by an objective
standard." 12 3 Rather, the test is whether the defendant
"truly believed that the copyright laws did not prohibit"
the actions in question. 12 4 The test embodies the principle that "the more unreasonable the asserted belief or
misunderstanding, the more likely it is that the finder
of fact will consider the asserted belief or misunderstanding to be nothing more than simple disagreement
with the known legal duties imposed by the law, and
will find that the government has carried its burden of
12 5
proving knowledge."
The fact-finder can use common sense and mere
observations to determine what the defendant subjectively believed when he engaged in the act. Recall
Moran where the court used such tools to determine
that the defendant (Moran, the video store owner) did
not have the requisite intent for criminal conviction.
First, the judge observed the defendant on the stand
and determined, "Moran struck me as an honest, albeit
naive, person. I was left with the impression that [he]
was befuddled and bewildered by the criminal prosecution." 12 6 Second, the judge determined that the defendant's background as a police officer did not suggest
"any particular knowledge about the intricacies of the
copyright laws." 12 7 Third, the court noted that the
defendant's belief that he was engaged in lawful activities was reasonable since it was supported by the recog-
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own refutation." 13 4 In the end, a similar statement
could be used to sum up the lessons of Grand Upright
Music: the willful disregard of copyright law is its own
insurance for falling subject to it.

nition that "under certain circumstances certain users
of copyrighted materials may lawfully engage in copying activity which is similar to [the defendant's] conduct."1 2 8 Fourth, the evidence indicated that the defen dant purchased more than one
authorized cassette of
a particular motio
picture, but made
only one duplicate
for each authorized
purcassette

POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE RAP INDUSTRY
Luckily for Biz Markie, his case never went to trial
in criminal term. 13 5 Had it done so, he and his fellow co-defendants would have likely faced severe
criminal sanctions. Yet in many ways, his pri-

n

chased. The judge
determined that a
true copyright pirate
would simply purchase
one original and pirate as
many additional copies as necessary. "In summary, when [the defendant's] actions
were viewed from the totality of the circumstances, the
government failed to convince [the fact-finder] beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] acted willfully.,,129
Going back to Grand Upright Music, it is clear that a
fact-finder would find that the defendants violated
copyright law by using a copyrighted work without
obtaining consent to use the original piece. The defendants all but admitted to knowing they had a legal duty
to obtain a license before using O'Sullivan's piece in Biz
Markie's recording. 1 30 In fact, the defendants even
maintained a department set up specifically to obtain
such clearances to use original works. Put simply, the
defendant's level of legal sophistication far surpassed
that of a private individual that runs a Mom & Pop
13 1
video store.
In addition to their level of sophistication in the area
of copyright law, the defendants knew that other sample clearance requests were pending before the rapper's
album was released. Thus, it follows that the record
label should have known that denial of permission by
rights-holders of other samples was a strong possibility.
Nevertheless, the defendants cut off communication
with rights-holders and "unilaterally elected to release
the album and single" without consent. 132 During the
civil trial, the defendants' main defense to the violation
1 33
boiled down to a simple defense of "everyone does it."
Unsurprisingly, the judge found this defense specious,
concluding, "[t]he mere statement of the argument is its

I

p

mary "crime" was nothing more than following
the rich sampling tradition of rap music and hiphop culture. Should such a result be proper and
inevitable, major changes in the rap industry
would need to occur overnight. Certain styles of
music that exist almost solely off the sampled music of

original music, such as today's genre of jazz rap music,
might disappear altogether.
Oddly enough, the only thing currently standing in
the way of such a result might be none other than what
Biz Markie suggested: since everyone is doing it, sampling may just be okay. The axiom, "today's plaintiff
may be tomorrow's defendant," is more than a cute saying for digital samplers; it's a reality of business and a
way of life. As such, copyright owners of sound recordings seldom claim their legal remedy against samplers
for several reasons. First, a company that itself has
artists under contract who sample is unlikely to sue
another record label whose copyrights it may want to
use in the future. Attorney Lionel Sobel, editor of The
Entertainment Law Reporter, believes that companies
are motivated to steer clear of actual litigation because
they themselves currently have artists under contract
who are sampling. Thus, record companies simply seek
to avoid what would otherwise be a rather expensive
"vicious circle." Rather than sue each other continually,
they choose not to pursue litigation. 136 In this way, the
record industry seems to be attempting to keep the judiciary out of the business of restricting sampling. Or, put
another way: everybody knows if you open the lion's
cage, there's always a chance he'll wind up coming for
you.
Still, artists who choose to sample works often intuitively feel that they owe some compensation to the original artist. Consider MC Hammer's thoughts upon completing his hit single "U Can't Touch This"-a work that
recalled much of Rick James' "Superfreak":
Right after I did the song, I said, 'hey, I gotta
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pay Rick James for this.' I did not need a
lawyer to tell me that... I'm borrowing
enough of his song that he deserves to be
compensated. 137
Consequently, the music industry has arguably
responded to the potential inequities created by sampling by setting up its own system of determining compensation. Add to this the current mechanical licensing
schemes, and one might well reach the conclusion that
the industry has provided better solutions than both the
1 38
legislature and courts combined.

thereby creating a license market controlled exclusively
by the holders of copyrights. True, copyright has always
been seen as entailing monopoly power, but allowing
copyright holders essentially to rewrite the compulsory
licensing provisions of the Copyright Act has to be
beyond any reasonable scope of that power.
Unfortunately, the impact on the industry from
courts interpreting the "willful" mens rea requirement
even according to the specific intent model might have
the effect of discouraging artists from seeking out
licenses. As seen above, that test requires the fact-finder to discern the defendant's subjective intent. The
court in Moran used a multitude of factors to determine
whether the defendant truly believed that the law did
not prescribe his activities, including whether he
seemed to grasp his legal obligations under the
Copyright Act. 139 If an artist who wants to use another's copyrighted piece unsuccessfully sought consent
before using the original piece, this might indicate to
the fact-finder a level of sophistication concerning copyright law, which would in turn make the defendant's
subjective belief that he was not violating the law more
unreasonable, and the suggestion that he was avoiding
his legal duty more plausible.140

In any case, this ad hoc system of dealing with copyright infringement and compensation for artists indicates the industry's desire to regulate certain areas of
digital sampling on its own. If criminal prosecution for
sampling enters the equation, the natural balance
established by the samplers and the original artists
would be disturbed.
Moreover, this would be far from the only negative
effect likely to accompany increased frequency of criminal sanctions. First, criminal prosecution for copyright
infringement, which sometimes uses the more liberal
"general intent" interpretation, instead of the more
exacting "specific intent" standard, could discourage
artists from using sampled portions of original musical
work altogether. This "chilling effect" is a common side
effect of over-regulation, especially where the threat
criminal prosecution hangs over an extremely complex
and intricate set of laws. Under the general intent
requirement, the government would simply have to

On the other hand, if courts were to use the general
intent standard, vindictive artists could bring criminal
charges against peers who inadvertently use copyrighted material. The music industry, like any other forprofit industry, is a competitive market; those who control the largest portions of the market are rewarded
handsomely. Thus, record labels could refer cases of
inadvertent copyright infringement to federal prosecutors to constrain the competition of rivals. This ploy
could keep rival record labels perpetually in court
defending against criminal prosecutions-and paying
for it every step of the way, no matter what the final verdicts.

establish that the defendant willfully intended to copy
the copyrighted work. As expressed above, this rigidity
violates the very purpose of the Copyright Act-to
encourage artists' creativity and protect the rights of
copyright owners.
In addition, if courts begin to apply the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act to the infringement of copyrighted sound recordings using the general intent standard, this application could give owners of originally

CONCLUSION
In the end, the handling of digital sampling may
come down to a choice between the lesser of two evils.
But courts should be clear about where that choice
properly leads them and interpret "willful" in § 506 of

copyrighted recordings an added advantage when the
parties negotiate mechanical licenses. The looming
threat of both civil and criminal penalties for infringement will give the original copyright owner an elevated
bargaining position over the seeker of a license. The
market price for such licenses will thus inevitably
increase due to the added restraints placed on artists
who choose to use sampled recordings in their music.
But the threat of criminal prosecution for copyright
infringement will keep the artists coming for consent,

the Copyright Act to require a specific intent to violate
a duty under the act, rather than merely a general
intent to copy protected material. Complex laws, such
as the Copyright Act, require flexibility in their interpretations; without it, those subject to their provisions
risk suffering criminal prosecution for inadvertent vio205
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lations.
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stands now, rap artists heavily sample original pieces of classic
music for a new, younger, and ever-growing audience. One can
only hope that the courts of today borrow less from those of the
past and instead strike a more appropriate balance between
the necessary aims of copyright law and the essential elements

In the context of sampling-related infringement,

criminal punishment should be reserved for those cases where
the sampling artist and his record label have abandoned their
duties to the original artist of a copyrighted piece in the name
of amassing million dollar record sales.
Should an opposite path be followed, the rap industry could
face anything from major changes to outright extinction. As it

of digital sampling. 4
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search of reported case law did not reveal a case showing Biz
Markie as a defendant in a criminal prosecution consistent with
the court's referral to the United States Attorney within the
court's geography.
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136 See Robert Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling,
Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 271, 274
(1996) ("[C]onsiderable uncertainty exists as to the circumstances under which an artist must license a sample, whether
certain kinds of samples are legal, and how much, if anything,
an artist should pay for a given use. The music industry has
responded to these issues by developing an ad hoc licensing system based on traditional notions of copyright infringement.");
Nancy L. McCullough, Making the Case Against Illicit

139 See Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1051-52 (discussing six reasons
why the alleged criminal copyright infringer did not subjectively believe that his conduct violated the federal Copyright Act).

140 See Grand Upright Music Ltd.,780 E Supp. at 184 ("In writing this letter, counsel for Biz Markie admittedly was seeking
'erms'for the use of the material. One would not agree to pay to
use the material of another unless there was a valid copyright!);
id. at 185 ("From all of the evidence produced in the hearing, it
is clear that the defendants knew that they were violating the
plaintiff's rights as well as the rights of others. Their only aim
was to sell thousands upon thousands of records."). See also
Moran, 757 F.Supp. at 1051 ("the more unreasonable the asserted belief or misunderstanding, the more likely it is that the finder of fact will consider the asserted belief or misunderstanding
to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the law, and will find that the government
has carried its burden of proving knowledge.").
141 See Loren, supra note 116, at 899.

